Entry tags:
So, politics
Last week saw three quite different and in their various ways unexpected results in the political world: and NDP government in Alberta; a Conservative majority in the UK; and the selection of Patrick Brown as leader of the Ontario Progressive Conservatives.
There's something for everyone here, in one sense: conservatives can be pleased with Patrick Brown and Cameron, moderates can be pleased that Farage resigned (sorry, he's withdrawn that: we didn't say "no backsies") and the UKIP did not grow, progressives can be happy with the NDP and with the SNP victory in Scotland (which was not unexpected).
In another sense, though, this is a thin layer of politics-as-usual spread over a lower level chaos.
One of the conclusions I, at least, drew from the low-level results in last year's civic elections in Toronto was that a significant chunk of the population is increasingly feeling threatened and are either scared or angry. In the case of Toronto, the angry vote translated to an irrationally high support for Doug Ford by groups whom his policies would disadvantage. The people expressing that anger were the urban poor in new-built areas -- inner suburbs -- and middle-class single-home dwellers, also in the inner suburbs. (I suspect a chunk of the scared vote went for Ford and a chunk for Tory.) I reference those elections because the very irrationality of one candidate highlighted the irrationality of the response in a way that higher-level elections, which have screening mechanisms in place, don't show as clearly. But I think the same general dynamic is present underlying all three results.
There are several long-term trends which aren't going to go away and which, to be frank, will require radically different solutions than any on offer over the short-to-medium term. These trends include the increasingly efficient use of computers in business and industry[1]; anthropogenic climate change; large-scale economic (for values of economic equivalent to "dying of poverty because of drought or other disruptions") and crisis-driven migrations, which show up in the UK and Canada as immigration anxieties and also religious toleration anxieties.
On top of that, for reasons having roots back in the latter part of the Industrial Revolution, we've been having a reassessment of social roles going on for about the last century which has (so far) generated a number of steps in the direction of gender equality, racial equality, and GLBTQIA equality, all at different stages and all incomplete, but already having an impact on the people who used to benefit (as a group) from the old structures, and all with the potential for considerably more social and economic upset in the future.
Having robots replace factory workers on the production line was one thing, and it's been happening for a while. Having computers simplify stock control, or equities trading, or various mid-level management tasks to the degree where a significant cut in headcount is possible is newer, and those changes are accelerating.
Having women replace men in a limited context, approved formally but heavily constrained by social expectations was one thing, and it's been happening at least since the invention of the typewriter and of Pitman shorthand (clerical jobs used to be male, like Bob Cratchit). Having the presence of women in the workforce change the way the workforce operates (harassment, normalization of flexible hours, having even a reasonable number of women in authority) is newer, and its growth is not slowing down; if anything, it's increasing.
Having cheap jobs offshored has been around, in effect, since the days when "Made in Japan" meant cheap and probably plastic; but we're now having previously offshored locations offshore themselves, to places like Bangladesh (China et al are now too expensive), and the backwash has created low-cost job niches in the American South, joining a race to the bottom.
The financial and environmental costs are piling up for many other components of the middle-class lifestyle. Even if petrol is a little cheaper right now, its overall trend will still be towards more costly, and its environmental cost -- extraction, refining, using -- becomes more serious in a world on the brink. (Today's Guardian headlines include: "Sea level rise accelerated over the past two decades, research finds"; "Tornadoes deal heavy damage from Texas to South Dakota"; "Ice loss in west Antarctica is speeding up".) California's drought continues with no sign of an end, and over a third of Arizona is in drought conditions (Lake Mead water levels are at an historic low). An increasing amount of economic migration and low-level conflict is driven by crop failures. That means that travel by car is less easy, food (especially meat) is more expensive, maintaining a lawn can be a drag. As a secondary problem (in North America), infrastructure which was put in place during the boom after the Second World War now needs replacement, all at once, and frequently upgrading to support a greater population.
If you're comparatively secure -- a knowledge worker whose job is unlikely to go away, in an area of the world where worse weather just means a bit more discomfort and slightly more expensive food -- you might be angry, but it's likely to be for ideological reasons, or reaction against ideology. But if you aren't within that charmed circle, there's a decent chance you feel under threat, and if you're attached to a static model of a way of life, regardless, you will probably feel under threat.
Which means angry, scared, or both.
Alberta's result was clearly driven in part by people being angry (with the Conservatives, at least) and possibly scared (of Wildrose, or of what happens if the oil prices don't come back up -- something over which provincial and national governments have no power).
England's re-election of the Conservatives -- and it was a specifically English vote that put them back in power -- seems to me more scared than angry: angry looks like voters for UKIP, SNP, and the Greens, in different ways. Scared people are less likely to vote for parties which promise radical change, and the "firm hand on the wheel" rhetoric of the Conservatives played very well to that sentiment, in a "things may be tough but they'd be worse without our policies" way; although with Cameron's promise of a referendum on the EU and his line on immigration he's probably managing to channel the angry voters who aren't so angry as to jump to the UKIP. (In the end, it looks as though the UKIP picked up Labour supporters more than Tory ones.)
<obvious>The SNP channels a lot of Scots anger.</obvious>
Patrick Brown seems, to me, to channel the same sort of anger that drove the Fords -- an anti-elite backlash from the hinterlands and the suburbs which is socially conservative and cares more about getting their positions out there than they care about winnability in a complex society. I mean, seriously, at the last leadership convention they chose the most conservative candidate, and look how that turned out, and he at least had experience at that level. Brown is a complete outsider coming from another level of government, no connections to the party leadership, and if anything an even more thorough social conservative tinge than Hudak. This is not a promising choice either for winning elections or for the task of building a winning coalition back together.
[1]There used to be a subset of books like Landauer's The Trouble with Computers: Usefulness, Usability, and Productivity which explored why the introduction of computing into most areas of work had not made work more efficient -- frequently they'd had other benefits, but they tended to complicate, not simplify, the areas where they were introduced. Somewhere in the 2000s, this stopped, and automation is now a much more effective mechanism for reducing headcount while retaining, or increasing, quality than it was even a short time back.
There's something for everyone here, in one sense: conservatives can be pleased with Patrick Brown and Cameron, moderates can be pleased that Farage resigned (sorry, he's withdrawn that: we didn't say "no backsies") and the UKIP did not grow, progressives can be happy with the NDP and with the SNP victory in Scotland (which was not unexpected).
In another sense, though, this is a thin layer of politics-as-usual spread over a lower level chaos.
One of the conclusions I, at least, drew from the low-level results in last year's civic elections in Toronto was that a significant chunk of the population is increasingly feeling threatened and are either scared or angry. In the case of Toronto, the angry vote translated to an irrationally high support for Doug Ford by groups whom his policies would disadvantage. The people expressing that anger were the urban poor in new-built areas -- inner suburbs -- and middle-class single-home dwellers, also in the inner suburbs. (I suspect a chunk of the scared vote went for Ford and a chunk for Tory.) I reference those elections because the very irrationality of one candidate highlighted the irrationality of the response in a way that higher-level elections, which have screening mechanisms in place, don't show as clearly. But I think the same general dynamic is present underlying all three results.
There are several long-term trends which aren't going to go away and which, to be frank, will require radically different solutions than any on offer over the short-to-medium term. These trends include the increasingly efficient use of computers in business and industry[1]; anthropogenic climate change; large-scale economic (for values of economic equivalent to "dying of poverty because of drought or other disruptions") and crisis-driven migrations, which show up in the UK and Canada as immigration anxieties and also religious toleration anxieties.
On top of that, for reasons having roots back in the latter part of the Industrial Revolution, we've been having a reassessment of social roles going on for about the last century which has (so far) generated a number of steps in the direction of gender equality, racial equality, and GLBTQIA equality, all at different stages and all incomplete, but already having an impact on the people who used to benefit (as a group) from the old structures, and all with the potential for considerably more social and economic upset in the future.
Having robots replace factory workers on the production line was one thing, and it's been happening for a while. Having computers simplify stock control, or equities trading, or various mid-level management tasks to the degree where a significant cut in headcount is possible is newer, and those changes are accelerating.
Having women replace men in a limited context, approved formally but heavily constrained by social expectations was one thing, and it's been happening at least since the invention of the typewriter and of Pitman shorthand (clerical jobs used to be male, like Bob Cratchit). Having the presence of women in the workforce change the way the workforce operates (harassment, normalization of flexible hours, having even a reasonable number of women in authority) is newer, and its growth is not slowing down; if anything, it's increasing.
Having cheap jobs offshored has been around, in effect, since the days when "Made in Japan" meant cheap and probably plastic; but we're now having previously offshored locations offshore themselves, to places like Bangladesh (China et al are now too expensive), and the backwash has created low-cost job niches in the American South, joining a race to the bottom.
The financial and environmental costs are piling up for many other components of the middle-class lifestyle. Even if petrol is a little cheaper right now, its overall trend will still be towards more costly, and its environmental cost -- extraction, refining, using -- becomes more serious in a world on the brink. (Today's Guardian headlines include: "Sea level rise accelerated over the past two decades, research finds"; "Tornadoes deal heavy damage from Texas to South Dakota"; "Ice loss in west Antarctica is speeding up".) California's drought continues with no sign of an end, and over a third of Arizona is in drought conditions (Lake Mead water levels are at an historic low). An increasing amount of economic migration and low-level conflict is driven by crop failures. That means that travel by car is less easy, food (especially meat) is more expensive, maintaining a lawn can be a drag. As a secondary problem (in North America), infrastructure which was put in place during the boom after the Second World War now needs replacement, all at once, and frequently upgrading to support a greater population.
If you're comparatively secure -- a knowledge worker whose job is unlikely to go away, in an area of the world where worse weather just means a bit more discomfort and slightly more expensive food -- you might be angry, but it's likely to be for ideological reasons, or reaction against ideology. But if you aren't within that charmed circle, there's a decent chance you feel under threat, and if you're attached to a static model of a way of life, regardless, you will probably feel under threat.
Which means angry, scared, or both.
Alberta's result was clearly driven in part by people being angry (with the Conservatives, at least) and possibly scared (of Wildrose, or of what happens if the oil prices don't come back up -- something over which provincial and national governments have no power).
England's re-election of the Conservatives -- and it was a specifically English vote that put them back in power -- seems to me more scared than angry: angry looks like voters for UKIP, SNP, and the Greens, in different ways. Scared people are less likely to vote for parties which promise radical change, and the "firm hand on the wheel" rhetoric of the Conservatives played very well to that sentiment, in a "things may be tough but they'd be worse without our policies" way; although with Cameron's promise of a referendum on the EU and his line on immigration he's probably managing to channel the angry voters who aren't so angry as to jump to the UKIP. (In the end, it looks as though the UKIP picked up Labour supporters more than Tory ones.)
<obvious>The SNP channels a lot of Scots anger.</obvious>
Patrick Brown seems, to me, to channel the same sort of anger that drove the Fords -- an anti-elite backlash from the hinterlands and the suburbs which is socially conservative and cares more about getting their positions out there than they care about winnability in a complex society. I mean, seriously, at the last leadership convention they chose the most conservative candidate, and look how that turned out, and he at least had experience at that level. Brown is a complete outsider coming from another level of government, no connections to the party leadership, and if anything an even more thorough social conservative tinge than Hudak. This is not a promising choice either for winning elections or for the task of building a winning coalition back together.
[1]There used to be a subset of books like Landauer's The Trouble with Computers: Usefulness, Usability, and Productivity which explored why the introduction of computing into most areas of work had not made work more efficient -- frequently they'd had other benefits, but they tended to complicate, not simplify, the areas where they were introduced. Somewhere in the 2000s, this stopped, and automation is now a much more effective mechanism for reducing headcount while retaining, or increasing, quality than it was even a short time back.